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Book Note: Ordinary Meaning, A Theory Of The Most Fundamental
Principle Of Legal Interpretation, by Brian G. Slocum
Abstract

ORDINARY MEANING IS A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK at the “ordinary meaning doctrine” used by
courts to interpret language. The ordinary meaning doctrine is the “judicial commitment to interpreting
language in legal texts according to its ‘ordinary meaning.’”2 This interpretation is based on an objective
standard: the meaning of a word can exist independently of differing opinions of that meaning.3 This book
argues that the current system used by judges in the United States fails to attain the goal of deciphering the
ordinary meaning of words.4 Slocum argues that the ordinary meaning doctrine has not been examined in
great depth,5 and offers a framework for how legal interpretation of ordinary meaning should be established.6
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Ordinary Meaning, A Theory Of The
Most Fundamental Principle Of Legal
Interpretation, by Brian G. Slocum1
MADELINE BOYCE
ORDINARY MEANING IS A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK at the “ordinary meaning

doctrine” used by courts to interpret language. The ordinary meaning doctrine
is the “judicial commitment to interpreting language in legal texts according to
its ‘ordinary meaning.’”2 This interpretation is based on an objective standard:
the meaning of a word can exist independently of differing opinions of that
meaning.3 This book argues that the current system used by judges in the United
States fails to attain the goal of deciphering the ordinary meaning of words.4
Slocum argues that the ordinary meaning doctrine has not been examined in
great depth,5 and offers a framework for how legal interpretation of ordinary
meaning should be established.6
In chapter one, Slocum introduces the ordinary meaning doctrine, giving
examples of interpretations of this doctrine from various U.S. Supreme Court
justices throughout history. He discusses the widespread reference to the ordinary
meaning doctrine in legal decisions,7 as well as some of the reasoning for this
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(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).
Ibid at 2.
Ibid at 4.
Ibid at 27.
Ibid at 28.
Ibid at 27.
Ibid at 5.
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influence.8 In this chapter, counter arguments to the use of the ordinary meaning
doctrine are introduced which are discussed in more detail in later chapters.
Chapter two situates the discussion of the proper approach to interpreting
ordinary meaning within the broader context of principles of legal interpretation
and the communicative meaning of words.9 It discusses several determinants of
communicative meaning.
Chapter three discuss the inherent tension between creating an objective
standard of ordinary meaning (given that it must be somewhat constant between
contexts) and the fact that the meaning of words is contextual in nature.10 This
chapter also assesses the justifications for the ordinary meaning doctrine in order
to show that legal interpretation of the meaning of words should include both
an exploration of communicative as well as ordinary meaning.11 This chapter
goes on to outline François Recanati’s hierarchy which breaks meaning into three
levels: “sentence meaning,” “what is said,” and “what is communicated.”12
In chapter four, Slocum discusses quantifiers13 as an example of an area
where contextual information needs to be assessed in order to determine
ordinary meaning, and criticizes courts’ failure to take quantifying information
into account when interpreting ordinary meaning.14 By discussing the theory
behind quantifiers, Slocum’s objective is to show that semantic theories can be of
assistance in creating structure for determining ordinary meaning. The chapter
ends with a discussion of the place of substantive and textual canons within
ordinary meaning interpretations.15
Chapter five addresses the use of dictionary definitions in the interpretation
of ordinary meaning. Slocum argues that dictionary definitions are too broad and
can convey “possible” rather than ordinary meaning.16 He stresses the importance
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Ibid at 8.
The communicative meaning of a word being defined here as “the linguistic meaning
communicated by the text considering all the sources of meaning relevant to the message the
author was trying to convey” Ibid at 5.
Ibid at 93-95.
Ibid at 95-98.
Ibid at 125.
“[A]n expression that modifies a referring expression in terms of amount.” Ibid at 32.
Ibid at 153.
“Substantive canons are normatively based presumptions about statutory meaning that
are derived from the common law, other statutes, or the Constitution. Textual canons are
presumptions that are drawn from the drafter’s choice of words, their grammatical placement
in sentences, and their relationship to other parts of the “whole” statute.” Ibid at 33.
Ibid at 215.
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of assessing word use on the sentence level, rather than acontextually.17 He then
uses case law to illustrate the difference between classical and contextual analyses
in judgments utilizing the ordinary meaning doctrine.18
Chapter six is the concluding chapter. Slocum summarizes the arguments
made throughout the book, and offers suggestions for further research.19 He also
discusses broad patterns of the use of the ordinary meaning doctrine, how it has
changed over time, and continues to change.20
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